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 The Conservatives and the Union: the  ?ŶĞǁŶŐůŝƐŚdŽƌǇŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞorigins of Anglo-Britishness  
Andrew Gamble  
The Union has for over a century been one of the cornerstones of Conservative politics, but 
it was not always so prominent. It was a rather late addition to the Conservative armoury, dating 
from the end of the nineteenth century, and in the last twenty years its value has been increasingly 
questioned. The creation of a Welsh Assembly and the re-establishment of a Scottish Parliament 
alongside the new power-sharing arrangements for Northern Ireland have raised questions over the 
viability of the existing institutional form of the United Kingdom, the old union state, but there is no 
agreement over what should replace it. While the Conservative party remains committed to 
maintaining the Union, the strength of its commitment has begun to be doubted, and some in the 
party have shown signs of wanting to give priority to English interests and English institutions. Is the 
Conservative party ceasing to think of itself as a Unionist party? 
A new English Toryism is emerging, which has a strong continuity with an older English 
Toryism which was partially buried by the ascendancy of Unionism. English Tories have always 
considered the Union to be desirable but it comes second in their thinking to the need to protect the 
sovereignty of the British state, the core of which is England and its traditional institutions. What is 
new about the contemporary Conservative party is that there is within it the revival of an English 
Toryism (Heffer 1999) which is happy to discard the older clothes of Empire and Union once so 
important to Conservative identity, and is unabashedly English in its focus (Kenny 2014). If other 
parts of the United Kingdom want to participate on English terms and show they are prepared to 
value the things which English Tories value then they are welcome to be part of this new assertive 
England. But the appetite among this part of the Conservative party for maintaining the old union 
state appears to be waning. There no longer seems to be any passion about defending the Union 
among these Conservatives or even of thinking about the United Kingdom in Unionist terms.  
The Conservatives  came to be identified as the party of the Union because of the Irish 
Question. They bitterly fought the rise of Irish Nationalism and the plans made by the Liberals to 
grant Ireland Home Rule. They made common cause with those Liberals who split from their party 
on this question and who styled themselves Liberal Unionists. In 1909 the Conservative Party added 
Unionist to its name and became the Conservative and Unionist party, a coalition of Conservatives 
and Unionists.  A formal merger with the Liberal Unionists took place in 1912. Even after the 
Republic of Ireland separated from the UK, preserving the Union of England with Wales, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland remained central to the purpose of the Conservative party.  Ulster Unionist 
and Scottish Unionist MPs took the Conservative Whip at Westminster. .  
In 1955  the Scottish Unionists  won fifty per cent of the vote  and fifty per cent of the seats 
ŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚdŚĞŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ alliance with the Ulster Unionists was also solid, and the party 
enjoyed  substantial representation in all parts of the United Kingdom including the northern cities. 
All that changed from the 1970s onwards. Northern Ireland became even more detached from the 
rest of the UK political system once the Ulster Unionists gave up the Conservative Whip following 
the suspension of Stormont in 1972. The Scottish Unionists formally became the Scottish 
Conservatives in 1965. Under Edward Heath the Conservatives responded to the growth of 
nationalism by  initially supporting devolution for Scotland  but under Margaret Thatcher they 
rejected devolution  became intransigently opposed both to any weakening of the Westminster 
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Parliament.  It was a strategy which failed to stem the long-term decline of Conservative support in 
Scotland. In 1997 the party did not win any of the 72 Scottish seats, and its vote share was 17 per 
cent. In the four elections since then the Conservatives have won only one seat and their vote share 
has declined further to around 15 per cent. The party has fared better in Wales where it has 
averaged around 25 per cent share of the vote, and although not winning any seats at all in 1997 and 
2001, has since recovered, winning 11 of the 40 Welsh seats in 2015.    
In its 2015 election manifesto ƚŚĞ ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƐ ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ P  ?The Conservative Party is the 
party of the Union  W and we will aůǁĂǇƐĚŽŽƵƌƵƚŵŽƐƚƚŽŬĞĞƉŽƵƌĨĂŵŝůǇŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ?This 
was already a change from earlier manifestos which tended to speak simply of Britain, implying an 
uncomplicated unity. Devolution of powers to Scotland and Wales in 1998 and the Good Friday 
Agreement which established power-sharing in Northern Ireland have fundamentally changed 
territorial politics in the UK. The old union state has been undermined, and with it the rationale of 
the Unionism to which the Conservatives have subscribed. There is a new emphasis on England and 
the needs of England. The 2015 manifesto went on to highlight the need for English Votes for English 
Laws (EVEL):  ?KŶĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƵŶĨĂŝƌŶĞƐƐƌĞŵĂŝŶs today: Scottish MPs are able to cast the decisive 
vote on matters that only affected England and Wales, while English and Welsh MPs cannot vote on 
matters that only affect Scotland. This leaves a space for resentment to fester  W and put our Union in 
ũĞŽƉĂƌĚǇ ? ? (Conservative Party 2015) There are now voices urging the party to rethink its politics and 
to recast itself primarily as an English party. This is in part a plea to return the Conservative party to 
its Tory roots, shorn of the Whig trappings of Union and Empire which have been the framework of 
Conservative politics for so long, and the basis of their appeal as a One Nation party. Unionism 
remains the official position of the party, partly because of the ingrained habit of thinking of the 
state as the United Kingdom, but it makes less and less sense to many party members and MPs, and 
the political logic is leading the party away from defending the Union as a priority. 
Tories and the union state 
The history of the Conservative party in relation to the Union is a complicated one. The loose 
Tory parliamentary faction which preceded the modern Conservative party originated before the 
creation of Great Britain. The term Tory was pejorative, an Irish term applied during the civil war by 
ƌŽŵǁĞůů ?ƐĂƌŵŝĞƐƚŽRoyalists during the Irish campaigns. The Tories were pursued men, outlaws. 
After the Restoration the term was revived as an insult to refer to the faction which supported the 
Crown and the succession of James VII and II to the throne despite his adherence to Roman 
Catholicism. Although most Tories in England were Anglican rather than Roman Catholic, they put 
loyalty to the Crown above everything else. After James was deposed, many Tories continued to 
regard him and his heirs as the legitimate monarch. The Whigs pushed through the Act of Succession 
in 1701 to ensure that if there was no (Protestant) Stuart heir, the succession should pass to the 
Electors of Hanover (who had a tenuous claim to the throne but were Protestant). After 1714 many 
Tories were not reconciled to the first two Hanoverian Kings and continued to support the Jacobite 
Pretenders. This allowed the Whigs to question the loyalty of Tories, and their leaders were excluded 
from office. Only after the failure of the second Jacobite rising in 1745-46 did loyalty to the actual 
King, (rather than the King over the water) and to the established Anglican Church became once 
again the touchstones of Tory identity. English Toryism between 1688 and 1746 was distinct from 
Jacobite support in Ireland or Scotland where it was much more closely associated with Catholicism.  
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During the reign of George III Tory politicians once again formed ministries. They were above 
all legitimists, defenders of the Crown and its prerogatives, defenders of the Church of England 
against Dissenters, and hostile to reform, particularly where it concerned the rules for election to 
Parliament or the rights of property. Many Tories had been opposed to the Act of Union with 
Scotland in 1707 because they feared it might undermine English institutions and the English 
Constitution. They were even more strongly opposed to making any concessions to the American 
colonists, because that would encroach on royal prerogatives, and attempted to suppress them by 
force. Those colonists who continued to support the Crown became labelled Tories by the 
revolutionaries.  The Tories accepted the union state, and further strengthened it with the Act of 
Union in 1801 which incorporated Ireland into the United Kingdom, but at the core of Tory thinking 
about the state and the constitution was the primacy of England. Wales, Scotland and Ireland were 
not equal but subordinate nations. They were joined to England but on English terms. What 
mattered most for Tories was that the principle of undivided national sovereignty  W Crown-in-
Parliament  W should be upheld. This meant a strong, centralised executive authority whose writ 
could not be challenged within the territory of the British state. The key institutions in this state 
were the Crown and the Church. Tories accepted that monarchs must rule through Parliament, but it 
was the prerogative powers of the Monarch and the defence of the institutions of the English state 
which were most important (Amery 1947). So long as the other nations of the United Kingdom were 
ůŽǇĂů ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌŽǁŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ?ĞŵƉŝƌĞ ŽĨ ŶŐůĂŶĚ ? ? ƚŚĞǇ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ĂĐĐŽƌĚĞĚ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
privileges and autonomy. If they were disloyal, demanding concessions which threatened the 
executive authority of the Crown and its Ministers then they had to be crushed. Tory ministers 
refused to accommodate the demands of the American colonists, and instead attempted military 
repression. 
Even when the Conservatives formally became a Unionist party in 1912 this same Tory reflex 
can be seen at work. Conservative Governments were prepared to provide extra resources for 
Ireland in a bid to meet Irish grievances, but they were implacably opposed to Home Rule because it 
threatened to dilute the authority of the British state. Conservatives felt so strongly about this that 
they were willing to support mutiny in the army against the Liberal Government, believing that its 
actions in preparing to coerce Ulster were illegitimate because it depended for its parliamentary 
majority on the support of the Irish National Party whose loyalty to the Crown was suspect (Blake 
1985).  The same logic, in much milder forms, has been on display in the reaction of the 
Conservatives to the rise of Scottish Nationalists seeking independence. The Conservatives wanted 
to retain the informal arrangements of the union state in which Scotland in practice enjoyed a great 
deal of administrative devolution and a financial settlement which was much more generous than 
for many other parts of the UK, together with its own Cabinet Minister which  parts of England with 
greater populations than Scotland lacked. Where Conservatives drew the line was restoring a 
Scottish Parliament, which they feared would strengthen not weaken nationalist sentiment, and 
create a political forum for the magnification of Scottish grievances against England, leading 
inexorably to separation.    
As a political philosophy Toryism was to become much more sharply defined through the   
response of Tories to the French Revolution, and to the claims for new political rights which it helped 
unleash. They fought a rearguard action to defend the increasingly unrepresentative British state.  
They delayed but were ultimately not able to prevent the Great Reform Bill in 1832 and the passage 
of liberal legislation which ended many privileges and exclusions once dear to Tory hearts. Tories 
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identified themselves in the nineteenth century as the champions of the traditional institutions of 
the British state  W Crown-in-Parliament (King, Lords and Commons), the Church of England, the Law, 
the Universities, the Bank of England, the Army and the Navy.  As Linda Colley has argued these 
institutions were consciously used in the eighteenth century to forge a British identity for the new 
union state (Colley 1992). This achieved considerable success but  at their core  a distinctive English 
identity remained. Tory governments legislated to advance a free economy in the 1820s, but it was 
English Tories who became the backbone of the fight to preserve the Corn Laws and agricultural 
protection in 1846. Agricultural protection was seen as vital to protect the interests of the English 
landowners. This proved another lost cause, along with the attempt to preserve discrimination 
against Catholics, Jews and Dissenters. In the new liberal era after 1832 the Conservatives fared 
poorly. There were some Conservative administrations between 1832 and 1886 but not many.  
What transformed the situation for the English Tories was the realisation by Conservative 
leaders like Benjamin Disraeli, Lord Salisbury and Randolph Churchill of the potential of the Empire 
and the Union to provide the Conservatives with a new popular appeal as the franchise was 
gradually extended. In this way the traditional conservatism of the Tories was joined with the much 
more dynamic popular movements of Union and Empire, which were linked to the Protestant 
working class in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and some of the big English cities like Liverpool.  The 
maintenance ŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐwas not forgotten but was subsumed within greater wholes. 
The need to defend the Union and the Empire against internal and external enemies took 
precedence. All parts of the Union and the Empire were accorded the status of full members of both 
so long as they professed loyalty to the British Crown and the Westminster Parliament. Joining the 
traditional concerns of the English Tories with the energy and enthusiasm of new popular 
movements transformed the Conservative party into a formidable mass political party, one of the 
most successful parties of the Right in the democratic era anywhere in Europe (Blake 1985).  
 Yet ultimately the attempt to keep the Irish within the Union failed, and Conservative 
efforts switched to protecting that part of the Irish population which wished to stay loyal to the 
Crown, the Ulster Unionists. The departure of the rest of Ireland was accepted. It was the biggest 
check to the expansion of England since the loss of the American colonies. For a while that loss was 
absorbed, but after 1945 the withdrawal from Empire began in earnest. By removing the rationale 
which had sustained the Union for so long, withdrawal from Empire also began to undermine the 
Union, and was one of the factors in the growth of nationalist movements in Wales and Scotland. 
The rise of the Scottish National Party (SNP) has been the biggest challenge to English Tories, since 
here is a movement explicitly rejecting ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŽůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚƚŚĞlegitimacy of the British 
state, as well as one which potentially commands majority support among Scots which was not the 
case with Irish Nationalists in Northern Ireland. The SNP may not reject the British Monarchy, but it 
rejects the rest of the British State and the possibility of being both Scottish and British. The English 
Tories had come to think of English and British as interchangeable.  
There are still those in the Conservative Party who counsel caution and want to continue the 
old policy of trying to preserve the union state, making concessions to the smaller nations within the 
United Kingdom, and not raising issues of fiscal transfers and how Scotland is represented in the 
Westminster Parliament. But there is an increasingly vocal section of the Conservative Party which 
has begun to speak of England and EnglaŶĚ ?ƐŶĞĞĚƐ ?ŶŐůŝƐŚsŽƚĞƐĨŽƌŶŐůŝƐŚ>ĂǁƐ(EVEL) commands 
great support, and William Hague, charged with coming up with a solution, was criticised for not 
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going nearly far enough in his proposals before the 2015 election.  As John Redwood put it in the 
HoƵƐĞŽĨŽŵŵŽŶƐ P ?ŶŐůĂŶĚĞǆƉĞĐƚƐŶŐůŝƐŚǀŽƚĞƐĨŽƌŶŐůŝƐŚŝƐƐƵĞƐ and we  expect simplicity and 
justice now - no ifs, no buts, no committee limitations, no tricks, give us what we want. We have 
waited 15 years for this. Will he now join me in speaking for England? ?(Hansard December 16th, 
2014 Column 1270)These English Tories want the equivalent of an English Parliament, if other parts 
of the United Kingdom are being allowed to move towards a form of Home Rule. Alex Salmond ?Ɛ
declaration before the 2015 election that the SNP would not support a Conservative Government at 
Westminster was condemned by many Conservatives as sabotaging the will of the British people. As 
some Scottish Conservatives pointed out, this was read in Scotland as English Tories saying that the 
will of the British people was the will of the English people, and that the Scots if they voted SNP no 
longer counted as part of the national community. Many English Tories reacted to the rise of the SNP 
in the same way as English Tories had reacted to the Irish Nationalists a hundred years before.  
There is remarkable continuity in the new English Toryism and the old. English Tories have 
always considered the Union to be desirable but it comes second in their thinking to the need to 
protect the sovereignty of the British state, the core of which is England and its traditional 
institutions. The Unionist approaches which developed at the end of the nineteenth century were 
strongly linked to Empire and the sense of England and its home base, the United Kingdom, being at 
the centre of a global empire. This was why the loss of Ireland was so hard to contemplate. Home 
rule was fought so bitterly because it was seen as a stepping stone to full separation. Devolution was 
fought so hard in the 1980s and 1990s because it was seen in the same way.  
The weakening of the union 
 Although the Conservatives still proclaim themselves a Unionist party, in electoral terms 
they no longer look much like a Unionist party. They have huge support in the South of England, and 
an improving position in Wales, but their support is weak in many parts of Northern England and 
Scotland, and Northern Ireland is now a separate political entity. Two crucial stages in the 
dismembering of the old Unionist Coalition were the estrangement of Northern Ireland Unionism 
from the Conservative party and the Unionist decline in Scotland. The first began once the Heath 
Government suspended Stormont and imposed direct rule in 1972. ǀĞŶĂĨƚĞƌ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞƚhe 
Conservatives never agreed to the return of the old Stormont as the Unionists wanted, because that 
would have meant the continued exclusion of the Catholic minority from any share in the 
'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? dŚĞǇ ĂůƐŽ ƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚ ŶŽĐŚ WŽǁĞůů ?Ɛ ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŶŐ EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ /ƌĞůĂŶĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ
rest of the UK and treating it exactly the same as any other region of England. The Conservative 
Governments of Thatcher and Major became convinced that the war could not be won by either side 
and that the only solution to the conflict was a settlement which had the consent of the Catholics as 
well as the Protestants. That meant that while they would not concede the reunification of Ireland 
while there was still a majority in favour of staying in the UK, they were willing to concede that it 
might be a possibility in the future. The Downing Street Declaration of 1993 outraged Conservative 
Unionists like Nicholas Budgen who seized on the wording in paragraph 4 of the Declaration which 
said that the British Government  had  ?no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland. ? 
He asked the Prime Minister to confirm that the Government still had a  ?ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ Žƌ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? in Wolverhampton. He highlighted that fact that the Major Government was willing to 
consider the possibility of Northern Ireland transferring to the Republic if that is what a majority of 
its citizens wanted to do at some point in the future. Northern Ireland could not be held in the 
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United Kingdom against its will. To many that seemed a statement of the obvious, but it had a wider 
significance. It clearly indicated that the British Government no longer regarded Northern Ireland as 
an integral part of its sovereign territory. James Moyneaux, the leader of the Ulster Unionists, 
commented in the same debate that a previous Downing Street Declaration issued by Harold Wilson 
had stated that the affairs of the Northern Ireland were an internal matter for the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom. Now it was a matter to be agreed between the United Kingdom and the Republic of 
Ireland. 
 This was always the problem with the union state which had evolved in Britain. It was a 
multinational state rather than a nation state. Four separate nations co-existed within a single state 
(Davies 1999; Mitchell 2009). Despite some attempts to forge a single British nation  the original 
national and regional identities remained the bedrock of the Union. That meant that if one of the 
component nations sought to leave the union state, it was very hard to argue against its right to self-
determination, since that principle had become the founding principle of the legitimacy of most 
states in the modern world. The anachronism of being a multinational state in a world largely 
composed of nation states has underlain the difficulty of managing the union state in the twentieth 
century. Ireland is the most obvious example where the arrangement became unsustainable. 
Northern Ireland remains so complicated even after the Good Friday Agreement ended the armed 
conflict because there are two nations within it, one wanting continued membership of the UK, but 
the other wanting union with Ireland. The power-sharing arrangements which were put in place 
acknowledge that reality. It has kept Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, but the 
connection is now fragile, and the Conservatives are no longer its champions at any price (Aughey 
2001).  
 The same logic has begun working itself out in Scotland.  The Union with Scotland worked so 
long as the Scots were content to subscribe to an overarching British identity and to share in the 
remarkable expansion of the British economy and the British empire over two centuries. Scotland 
retained its own institutions, particularly its legal system and its Church, and the gains from 
participation in the British state outweighed the disadvantages for most Scots. Scotland was 
integrated into the British state through the empire and then through the welfare state in the 
twentieth century. The first was associated with the Conservative party, the second with the Labour 
party.  It is the decline of both of these that has provided the seed bed for a new nationalism which 
has defined itself against control by Westminster and reasserted a specific Scottish identity and 
Scottish interest as the basis of its politics.  
 Under Edward Heath the Conservatives temporarily renounced their Tory instincts for 
preserving undiluted the principle of Westminster sovereignty, both in relation to the Union and to 
Europe. Instead they resorted to a Gladstonian strategy, addressing the rise of Scottish Nationalism 
by exploring the possibility of devolution, giving the Scots much greater control over their own 
affairs. Many Scottish Conservatives, including Alick Buchanan-Smith and Malcolm Rifkind, became 
advocates of devolution as the best way to preserve and strengthen the Union.  Such a view implied 
as it had done for earlier Liberals like Winston Churchill, the evolution of the informal union state 
into a much more formal federation. 
This flirtation with the Whigs was short-lived. Margaret Thatcher went back to the 
traditional Tory position on the Union and in doing so laid the foundations for the revival of 
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Englishness and the turn to Euroscepticism among Conservatives. She began by  flatly opposing the 
devolution proposals put forward by the Labour Government. Buchanan-Smith and Rifkind resigned 
from the Shadow Cabinet as a result in 1976. The new intransigent constitutional line did not cause 
the collapse of Conservative support in Scotland. That had already started in the 1960s, driven by 
many factors such as secularisation which led to the steady decline of the once-mighty Protestant 
working class Unionist vote. But it certainly did not help. The Conservative administration of 
Scotland under the Thatcher Government followed a familiar path. Scotland (and Wales) were both 
treated differently (and often more generously) than England. But the perception in Scotland that 
the country was being used as a test bed for Thatcherite policies such as the poll tax, and was being 
ruled from Westminster by a party for which it had not voted proved a powerful recruiting tool both 
for supporters of devolution within the United Kingdom and supporters of independence. The 
Conservatives stuck to their opposition to devolution to the last, calling for a No vote in the 
referendums in 1998. They were still opposed to devolution in 2005 when David Cameron made it 
clear that he believed devolution was an accomplished fact and had to be made to work (Bale 2013). 
There was no prospect of a future Conservative Government repealing the devolution legislation 
passed by Labour in 1998.  
 After the aberration of Edward Heath the rise of Scottish Nationalism emphasised that the 
instincts of the party on matters constitutional were Tory rather than Whig. The best way to 
preserve the Union was to maintain the undivided sovereignty of the British state. Cultural identities 
are one thing in a multinational state, but when they are translated into political identities they risk 
breaking the state apart. Scottish Nationalists oppose the continuance of the Union and wish to 
renounce their loyalty to the British state. In the past faced by movements seeking autonomy or 
separation from the British State the Conservatives have often advocated forcible suppression. In 
dealing with Scottish nationalism the option of repression is not available. The right of self-
determination has been conceded to the Scots as it never was to the Americans or to the Irish. But in 
conceding it, and being made aware of just how many Scots were prepared to vote for 
independence in the 2014 referendum, it has cooled support for the Union among Conservatives.  
Since the SNP took control of the Government at Holyrood in 2007 first as a minority then as a 
majority government, and followed it up by winning 56 out of the 59 Scottish seats at Westminster 
(on 50 per cent of the vote) the Conservatives have increasingly seen Scotland, like Northern Ireland, 
as a separate entity, and posing a number of threats to the rest of the UK. Chief among them are the 
threat to the nuclear submarine base at Faslane on the Clyde; secondly the increasing unfairness of 
the budget subsidy Scotland receives from Westminster under the Barnett formula which has 
enabled the Scottish Government to fund a more generous welfare state than exists south of the 
ďŽƌĚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƌĚůǇ ƚŚĞtĞƐƚ>ŽƚŚŝĂŶYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐDWƐƚŽǀŽƚĞŽŶ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ
before the Westminster Parliament which only concern England. English MPs do not have the same 
right to vote on matters which have been devolved to Scotland.  
 The West Lothian Question has generally been ignored, because it is very hard to provide an 
acceptable answer (Bogdanor 2009; King 2015). It would not matter very much if the representation 
of Scotland at Westminster was roughly equal between Labour and the Conservatives. But since the 
creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1998 first Labour and now the SNP have scooped almost all the 
MPs. It is this imbalance which has made the West Lothian Question a live issue for English 
Conservatives. Many of them have become strong supporters of English Votes for English Laws. This 
can take a number of forms, and there have been several different reports. At one extreme there are 
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demands for a full English Parliament to counterbalance the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish 
Parliament. That would solve the West Lothian Question but would raise serious issues of what 
would be the status of the Westminster Parliament. The Prime Minister of the English Parliament 
would tend to overshadow the UK Prime Minister, particularly if they came from different parties. At 
most general elections since 1945 the Conservatives have won a majority of English constituencies, 
so they would expect to control an English Parliament. The attitude of Conservatives who support 
such a change is that it is the logic of devolution. It is only fair that all nations including England are 
treated the same. Other nations have no cause to resent England having charge of those issues 
which only concern England.  
 This is a sound Tory argument, but it has implications. Since England has 85 per cent of the 
population of the United Kingdom an English Parliament would overshadow the Scottish Parliament,  
the Welsh Assembly and Stormont to such an extent that they would become subordinate bodies. It 
would be hard to maintain a UK Parliament in which all participated as equals. Such an asymmetrical 
Union would breed resentments and would make breakup more likely. The logic would be the 
creation of a genuine federation, but that would mean a written constitution and the breakup of 
England into regions, since no working federation anywhere in the world has one of its components 
comprising more than 50 per cent of the population. Most English Tories would rather see the 
breakup of the United Kingdom than the breakup of England. Many like Charles Moore feel sad 
about the prospect that the Union flag and the familiar geographical image of the national territory 
will be lost if the United Kingdom breaks up (Moore 2014). But   many Conservatives  seem 
increasingly resigned to it. Their idea of England and maintaining the traditional sovereign authority 
of the state counts for more than maintaining the British Union. Their words are different. The Union 
is still extolled, as it was in the 2015 Manifesto. But the actions are clear. The demonising of the 
Scots in the 2015 election in order to mobilise voters in England against Labour and against UKIP, to 
ensure a Conservative majority was not missed north of the border. Many Scottish Conservatives 
saw it for what it was. The Tories returning to their English roots.    
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